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The global financial crisis in 2008-2009 has affected almost all countries. 
Vietnam was hit by a large fall in export demand and foreign direct investment. 
Many governments quickly prescribed stimulus packages and Vietnam was no 
exception. It reduced taxes and increased government spending, mainly by 
subsidizing loans to state-owned enterprises. The question is what the 
stimulated impact is, if any, and whether a better outcome could have been 
achieved by a different mix of policies. In this paper, we use a simple general 
equilibrium model to quantify the impact of the various components of the 
stimulus package on the whole economy as well as agricultural sector. The 
results suggest that, in the short run at least, the stimulus package marginally 
stabilised national production and income. The package led to a reduction in 
total welfare because it favoured the non-agricultural sector. The poor in the 
agricultural sector could be better off if the investment policy were to boost 
demand for agricultural products. Furthermore, the risk of inflation and real 
exchange rate appreciation could undermine national competitiveness. 
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The recent global financial crisis affected almost all countries. Vietnam, a small 
open developing country, was hit by a fall in export demand and foreign direct 
investment in late 2008 and 2009. Many governments quickly prescribed 
stimulus packages and Vietnam was no exception. The question is what the 
stimulated impact is, if any.  
To answer the question, we expand the 1-2-3 CGE model of Devarajan et al. 
(1997) to include the agricultural sector, which plays an important role in 
developing countries. In its original form, the model has one country, two 
sectors and three goods. In Vietnam, more than half of the labour force is 
employed in agriculture. Most of Vietnam’s poor are living in rural areas and 
earning their living from agriculture. Therefore the results of the model have 
implications for the policy impact on inequality and poverty reduction.  
The results suggest that, in the short run at least, the stimulus package 
marginally stabilised national production and income. The package leads to a 
reduction in total welfare due to its favouring the non-agricultural sector. The 
poor in the agricultural sector could be better off if the investment policy were to 
boost the demand for agricultural products, possibly through investment in 
industries having strong backward linkage with agriculture. There is also the risk 
of inflation and real exchange rate appreciation, which could undermine the 
national competitiveness. 
Thanks to its simplicity, the expanded model could be mobilized in the future 
when policy makers need a quick assessment of a potential policy impact. 
Estimated results from the model could also be used as inputs for further 
research using micro models of household-level impact assessment with 
household survey data. 
The following section provides the overview of the Vietnamese economy before 
and during the crisis. Section 3 examines the reasoning of the stimulus 




together with data sources for applying the model in Vietnam. Section 4 
discusses the simulation results and section 5 concludes. 
2. VIETNAM BEFORE AND DURING THE CRISIS 
The extended model is applied to the case study of Vietnam, an agricultural-
based economy located in the Southeast Asia. According to the national 
statistical office, the agricultural sector employs more than half of the total labor 
force but produces one fifth of the total GDP. One fifth of total population live on 
less than one dollar a day, and most of these are in rural areas and earn their 
living from agricultural production (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development 2009). 
The country is in the transition from a central planned to a market-based 
economy. Vietnam is increasingly integrated into the international economy, 
marked by its accession into the World Trade Organization in 2007. The total 
trade volume was up to 170 per cent of GDP in 2007. Nonetheless the financial 
sector is less open to the rest of the world. As a result, Vietnam was immunized 
against the sub-prime crisis beginning in 2007. However, it cannot avoid the 
impact of the global economic crisis through export and foreign investment 
channels. In 2009, for the first time since the 1997 Asian crisis, total exports and 
agricultural exports as well as implemented FDI fell. 
The growth rates of total exports and agricultural exports fell from 29 percent 
and 27 percent per year in 2008 down to -9 percent and -7 percent per year in 
2009 respectively (Figure 1). These shocks are expected to have large adverse 
impacts on the agricultural sector and on the whole economy. 
The world prices of Vietnam’s exports and imports decreased sharply, 
especially for non-agricultural items. Because export and import prices move 
together, it is hard to tell initially if these price shocks have a positive or 




The implemented foreign direct investment kept reducing in 2008 and 2009 
from the peak in 2007 when Vietnam became a member of the World Trade 
Organization. However, the domestic investment increased in 2009, possibly in 
response to the government’s loan subsidy and loose monetary policy (Figure 
3). 
The concern is that in 2009, the growth rate of total investment increases due to 
improvement in domestic investment, while that of investment in agriculture 
decreases (Figure 4). Thus the share of agriculture in investment keeps 
reducing from an already low level (6 per cent
2) compared with its contribution 
to GDP (20 per cent
3). This likely hurts the poor who earn their living from 
agriculture. 
To cope with the unfavourable shocks, in late 2008 and 2009, the Vietnam 
government quickly announced a relatively large stimulus package of about 
US$6 million (7 per cent GDP in 2008). This includes a short term (only in 2009) 
intervention of 1 per cent of GDP covering credit subsidy, tax cut, one-time 
transfer to the poor; and a long term investment in infrastructure, trade 
promotion, etc. However, there has not been an official announcement detailing 
the distribution and source of such huge expenditures. Therefore, we choose to 
calculate the size of the stimulus from the fiscal balances reported by the 
Ministry of Finance. Figure 5 shows a reduction in tax revenue and increases in 
expenditure, mostly capital expenditure in 2009 compared with 2008.  
The combination of negative external shocks and stimulus policies resulted in 
the modest growth rate of 5.32 per cent and agricultural growth rate of 1.83 per 
cent in 2009, lower than those in 2008. Noteworthy, the reduction in agricultural 
sector growth is much deeper than that of the whole economy (Figure 6). This 
highlights our concern of an adverse effect on the poor due to the focus of 
stimulus policy on state-owned enterprises and the non–agricultural sector. 
                                                 
2 Investment in 2008 and 2009, General Statistics Office 2010, www.gso.gov.vn. 




3. STIMULUS PACKAGE, 1-2-3 MODEL AND ITS EXTENSION 
Theoretical base of the stimulus package 
The justification of government intervention in times of crisis dates back to 
Keynes. Stiglitz (2009) specifies the problem of the current global crisis is an 
organizational one. Human and physical resources are available just like before 
the crisis. There is a failure in organizing these resources to produce output.  
Stiglitz (2009) mentions two schools of Keynesian thought explaining the root 
cause of crises. One claims wage rigidities, while the other attributes the lack of 
aggregate demand as sources of the market failure. However, large wage falls 
during crises leads to the rejection of the former argument (Stiglitz 2009). 
Keynes states that in the Great Depression, wage decrease leads to income 
reduction therefore demand shortage. 
Nonetheless, there are different explanations of the demand fall. Stiglitz (2009) 
argues that the aggregate demand insufficiency at the global level is caused by: 
(i) the accumulated increase in inequality, transferring money to the rich who 
spend a lesser part of their income; and (ii) “the massive build-up of reserves” 
as countries learn from 1997 financial crisis. On the other hand, Willenbockel 
and Robinson (2009) attribute the declines in the rich countries’ demand for 
export from developing countries and changes in term of trade unfavourable to 
primary product exporters are major causes of crisis in developing countries. 
According to this line of thinking, government intervention is needed to address 
the fall in aggregate demand. Monetary policy was used first but with limited 
impact as it could not stimulate demand. Therefore the G-20 countries choose 




Graph – Correlation between stimulus size and GDP growth rate 
 
Sources: Prasad and Sorkin 2009 (Size of stimulus) and World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 2010 (GDP growth rates) 
The above figure shows positive correlation between stimulus intervention and 
the growth recovery in G-20 countries. The bigger the stimulus package (in 
percentage of GDP), the lesser the decrease in growth rate between 2007 and 
2009. However the correlation is not so strong without Saudi Arabia. The 
questions are whether there is a causal relationship between stimulus 
intervention and whether such impact, if any, has a trickle-down effect.  
The stylized model of one country, two sectors, and three goods (1-
2-3 model) 
In order to quantify the stimulus effect, it is essential to separate out the impact 
of crisis from the observed national economic performance. The computational 
general equilibrium (CGE) model is a natural tool for such policy analysis as it 
allows to introduce one shock at a time, like a “laboratory that supports 



















































































Taking the Occam’s Razor approach of “Use the simplest model adequate to 
the task at hand” (Devarajan and Robinson 2002), the one-country, two-sector, 
three-good model (the 1-2-3 model) is a good start. This model was developed 
by Devarajan et al. (1997) to analyze the interaction between the external 
shocks and economic policies and the economy. The model is for one country 
with two sectors (producing tradable and non-tradables) and three goods 
(export good, domestic good and import good). There are three actors (a 
household, a producer and the rest of the world). 
The model assumes a small country, facing fixed world prices. Output is a 
combination of export and domestic goods, assuming constant elasticity of 
transformation. There is imperfect substitution between import and domestic 
goods with constant elasticity of substitution.  
Devarajan et al. (1997) also assumes fixed output, implying full employment of 
all resources. Other exogenous variables include tax rate, transfers, saving rate, 
government consumption and the trade balance. Several parameters 
(elasticities) are taken from available literature. 
The main advantages of the model are the “modest data requirement” and the 
ability to run in Excel using Solver, an optimization feature. Excel is easier to 
learn and use than other programming tools.  
Extension of the 1-2-3 model to include agricultural production and 
trade 
The 1-2-3 model is useful for analyzing the impact of external shocks and policy 
packages, but cannot evaluate the extent of such impact on the poor. Our 
solution is to separate both tradable and non-tradable goods into agricultural 
and non-agricultural components. Export goods, domestic goods and import 
goods are also separated accordingly. This is of particular interest for Vietnam, 
an agrarian economy where the poorest people are self-subsistent farmers.  
There are 31 equations (see appendix), which are the direct extension from the 




possibility frontiers for agricultural and non-agricultural production. Equations (3) 
and (4) are the agricultural and non-agricultural composite commodities 
consumed by the single household. Equation (5) and (6) are the household 
demand for the composite agricultural and non-agricultural goods. Equations (7) 
and (8) describe the efficient ratios of exports to domestic output in agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors. Equations (9) and (10) are ratios of desired import 
to domestic goods in two sectors. Equation (11) describes tax revenue as a 
composite of revenue from tariffs, direct and indirect taxes. Equation (12) 
defines the sources of household income. Equation (13) describes aggregate 
saving as the total of household saving, government saving and trade account 
balance. Equation (14) calculates aggregate consumption as the difference 
between disposable household income and savings.  
Equations from (15) to (25) describe prices, where the real exchange rate is the 
numeraire. Equations (26) to (32) are market clearing equilibrium conditions. 
Equations (33) to (36) are accounting identities and could be derived from 
equations (21) to (24) respectively. Furthermore, equation (31) of saving-
investment identity is dropped as superfluous thanks to Walras Law. Thus there 
are 31 equations, matching the 31 endogenous variables. 
From a small open developing country perspective, external shocks in crisis 
include reductions in exports and foreign investment. Hence, in the modified 
model, we change the closure by making exports and investment exogenous 
and letting output and saving rate be determined by the model. We also assume 
the share of agriculture in total consumption is fixed. As in the original model, 
consumption reflects welfare in the extended model.  
Data and measurement issues 
Vietnam is chosen for the case study as it is a small open developing country 
suffering from the global crisis and quickly launches a sizable stimulus package. 
The data used in the model is the non-competitive Input-Output Table (I0 table) 
for the year 2007, compiled from a survey in 2008 and published by the General 




aggregated into two commodities: agriculture and non-agriculture. Output, 
household consumption, investment, government consumption, exports, imports 
and tariffs at producer price from the IO table are then adjusted to market price 
indexes using 2007 national accounts from 2007 Statistical Year Book (General 
Statistics Office 2008). 
Fiscal account data is from the annual State Budget Balance issued by Ministry 
of Finance. The balance of payment is quoted from Vietnam table in the Key 
Indicator 2009 (Asian Development Bank 2010).  
Indexes in VND from General Statistics Office are in 1994 prices. Indexes from 
Ministry of Finance are deflated using GDP deflator (in the case of tax revenue) 
and non-agriculture GDP deflator (in the cases of capital and current 
expenditure) from General Statistics Office (2010). 
Parameters for elasticities of substitution are taken from Cameroon CGE model 
(Condon et al. 1987). The country shares many characteristics with Vietnam, 
including being a small open agrarian economy with the share of agriculture in 
total GDP approximately 20 percent. The agricultural sector in Cameroon is also 
the country’s engine for growth, maintaining the sectoral growth rate of nearly 4 
percent since 1988 (World Bank 2009a, World Bank 2009b). 
Vietnam’s economy is assumed to be at equilibrium in 2007
4. Shocks are 
constructed by inflating exogenous variables. The economy in 2008 is got by 
shocking with 2008 rates. The crisis scenario in 2009 is constructed by 
shocking export, world prices and foreign direct investment with 2009 rates. The 
model does not allow direct shock of foreign direct investment. Instead, we 
separate the change of investment in 2009 into two shocks: reduction in foreign 
direct investment and improvement in domestic investment. The latter could 
reflect the indirect impact of the stimulus policy. 
                                                 
4 We choose 2007 as the base year and 2003-2007 rates for counterfactual scenario as 2003-2007 is a 
fairly stable period. In contrast, 2008 is a chaotic year with high inflation; the government has to tighten 
monetary policy; and the economy has to suffer from the world food crisis with a confusing combined 




The policy impact scenario is established by adding policy shocks in 2009 to the 
crisis scenario. The impact is then compared with the outcome in case of a 
different government intervention with more investment in agricultural sector. 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In order to analyze the impact of the stimulus package in Vietnam, crisis shocks 
and policy interventions are introduced into the CGE model one by one. The 
data is based on 2007. There are 3 aggregated scenarios
5: 
-  S1 (crisis scenario): the combination of reduction in exports, world 
prices for exports and imports, and foreign direct investment by their 
growth rates in 2009. 
-  S2 (stimulus package): the combination of crisis shocks and the 
stimulus package, including increase in government consumption, tax 
and tariff by their growth rates in 2009. 
-  S3 (assumed shift in investment to agriculture): Assuming investment 
policy focuses on boosting industries having strong backward linkages 
with agriculture, thereby increasing demand for agricultural products 
(supposing 20 percent of total investment increase is spent for 




                                                 
5 We restrict to 3 main scenarios due to the scope of the paper. To assess the impact of separated shocks 
(for example to consider the impact of government spending distinguished from tax cut), more detailed 




Table 1 – The simulated 2008 baseline, the 2009 counterfactual and 
scenarios 















exports  1  1.27  1.22  0.93  0.93  0.93 
Non-agricultural 
exports  1  1.30  1.25  0.90  0.90  0.90 
World price of 
agricultural 
exports 
1  1.26  1.08  0.94  0.94  0.94 
World price of 
non-agricultural 
exports 
1  1.25  1.10  0.88  0.88  0.88 
World price of 
agricultural 
imports 
1  1.22  1.07  0.90  0.90  0.90 
World price of 
non-agricultural 
imports 
1  1.18  1.06  0.88  0.88  0.88 
Investment in 
agriculture  1  1.14  1.10  1.00  1.08  2.14 
Investment in 
non-agriculture  1  1.07  1.17  0.97  1.12  1.08 
Government 
spending  1  1.03  1.11  1.11  1.20  1.20 
Direct tax  1  1.02 0.98 0.98 0.75 0.76 
Indirect tax  1  1.01 1.03 1.03 1.12 1.64 
Import tariff  1  1.21 1.13 1.13 1.35 1.35 
 
Table 2 compares outcome changes of scenarios 2 and 3 from those of 
scenario 1, in percentage changes. Impacts of the stimulus package are shown 
by comparing outcomes of scenario 2 with scenario 1. Similarly, the impact of a 
supposed package in favour of agriculture is shown by comparing scenario 3 




Table 2 - Impact of the stimulus package and the assumed shift in 
investment to agriculture 
  ΔS2/S1  ΔS3/S1 
Variable  Policy interventions 
after crisis  
Assumed shift in 
investment to boost 
demand for agriculture 
  %  % 
Total income  0.01  0.50 
Total production  0.01  0.42 
Agricultural 
production 
-1.01  3.11 
Total consumption  -8.39  -7.69 
Total import  0.01  -0.04 
Total saving  16.97  20.38 
Government saving  -11.12  10.93 
Agricultural producer price  -0.67  2.06 
Non-agricultural producer 
price 
0.00  -0.20 
Domestic price (*)  0.23  0.92 
Consumer price  1.25  4.65 
Note: The exchange rate is the numeraire in this model, thus the changes in domestic 
price reflect the changes in real exchange rate. 
Column 1 of table 2 shows that the stimulus spending could help stabilize 
income and production at the cost of government saving. However, the total 
welfare reflected in total consumption is reduced. Agricultural production and 
producer prices decrease, making farmers worse off. Moreover, the package 
provides little help to the non-agricultural producers as their production 
improved a little and their prices remain unchanged. There is also a threat of 




cent if investment is directed into agriculture. Inflation and currency appreciation 
could undermine the economy’s competitiveness. 
The results indicate that the stimulus package does not help improve living 
standards and alleviate poverty. This possibly comes from the different 
elasticities between agriculture and non-agriculture, while most of government 
spending is in non-agricultural sector. 
Column 2 of table 2 describes the impact of a stimulus package assuming 
restructure of investment toward industries using agriculture input intensively, 
such as food processing industry and tourism. This hypothetical package helps 
increase income and production, while enhancing government and total 
savings. Total welfare is still reduced but less than the case of no investment 
restructuring. The farmers are better off with higher agricultural production 
together with higher selling prices. However, the cost of inflation and real 
exchange rate appreciation is higher.  
5. CONCLUSION 
The 1-2-3 model is a useful tool to analyze the impact of government 
intervention in the economic crisis. It could be extended by including primary 
production and trade to trace the impact of government intervention on the poor. 
The Vietnam case study illustrates that the stimulus package has a positive 
effect on total income and production, but the poor may not benefit from that. 
Further research may extend the model further by including factor markets, 
disaggregating the sectors as well as government consumption and investment. 
Elasticities could also be calibrated from micro-based data. We also plan to 
expand the current static model to a dynamic one to capture the longer term 
effect of stimulus package (taking into account the expected future increase in 




Figure 1 – Export growth 
 
Source: General Statistics Office, 2010 
Figure 2 – Change in export and import price (previous year = 100) 
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Figure 3 – Growth of investment by ownership 
 
Source: General Statistics Office, 2010 
Figure 4 - Investment growth 
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Figure 5: Tax revenue and government expenditure in 1994 price 
(trillion VND) 
 
Source: Indexes in current prices from Ministry of Finance, State Budget 
Balances, 2010. GDP deflators from General Statistics Office, 2010. 
Figure 6: Total GDP and agricultural GDP growth rates (%) 
 
































Asian Development Bank (2010), ‘Key Indicators 2009’. 
Condon, T., Dahl, H. and Devarajan, S. (1987), ‘Implementing a computable 
general equilibrium model on GAMS – the Cameroon model’, Tech. rep., the 
World Bank. 
Devarajan, S. and Robinson S. (2002), ‘The impact of computable general 
equilibrium models on policy’, presented at a conference on “Frontiers in 
Applied General Equilibrium Modeling”, Yale University, 5-6 April 2002, 
New Haven, Connecticut. 
Devarajan, S., Go, D.S., Lewis, J.D., Robinson, S., and Sinko, P. (1997), 
‘Simple General Equilibrium Modeling’, in Francois, J. and Reinert, K. 
(eds), in Applied methods of trade policy analysis – A handbook, 
Cambridge University Press. 
General Statistics Office (2010), ‘Statistical Data’, Hanoi 
<http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=217>. 
General Statistics Office (2009), ‘2007 Input-Output Table’, Hanoi. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2009), ‘Strategy of Agriculture 
and Rural Development in 2011-2020’, Hanoi.  
Ministry of Finance (2010), Annual ‘State Budget Balances’ since 2002, Hanoi, 
<http://www.mof.gov.vn/portal/page/portal/mof_vn/1351583>.  
Pradad, E. and Sorkin, I. (2009), ‘Assessing the G-20 economic stimulus plans: 




Stiglitz, J. (2009), 'The global crisis, social protection and jobs', International 
Labour Review, 148(1-2), 1-13. 
Willenbockel, D. and Robinson, S. (2009), ‘The global financial crisis, LDC 
exports and welfare: analysis with a world trade model’, Munich Personal 
Repec Archive paper No. 15377, <http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/15377>. 
World Bank (2009a), ‘Vietnam at a glance’, Development Economics LDB 
Database, Washington D.C. 
World Bank (2009b), ‘Cameroon at a glance’, Development Economics LDB 




APPENDIX 1 - DEFINITIONS 
 
Endogenous variables 
XA: Aggregate agricultural output 
XN: Aggregate non-agricultural output 
MA: Agricultural import 
MN: Non-agricultural import 
s: average saving rate 
DA
S: Supply of domestic agricultural good 
DN
S: Supply of domestic non-agricultural good 
DA
D: Demand for domestic agricultural good 
DN
D: Demand for domestic non-agricultural good 
QA
S: Supply of composite agricultural good 
QN
S: Supply of composite non-agricultural good 
QA
D: Demand for composite agricultural good 
QN
D: Demand for composite non-agricultural good 
P
eA: Domestic price of agricultural export good 
P
eN: Domestic price of non-agricultural export good 
P
mA: Domestic price of agricultural import good 
P
mN: Domestic price of non-agricultural import good 
P
dA: Producer price of domestic agricultural good 
P
dN: Producer price of domestic non-agricultural good 
P
tA: Sale price of composite agricultural good 
P
tN: Sale price of composite non-agricultural good 
P





xN: Price of aggregate non-agricultural output 
P
qA: Price of composite agricultural output 
P
qN: Price of composite non-agricultural output 
R: Exchange rate 
T: Tax revenue 
S
g: Government saving 
Y: Total income 
CA: Aggregate consumption in agricultural good 
CN: Aggregate consumption in non-agricultural good 




eA: World price of agricultural export good 
pw
eN: World price of non-agricultural export good 
pw
mA: World price of agricultural import good 
pw
mN: World price of non-agricultural import good 
t
mA: Agricultural tariff rate 
t
mN: Non-agricultural tariff rate 
t
eA: Agricultural export subsidy rate 
t
eA: Non-agricultural export subsidy rate 
t
s: Sales/ excise/ value-added tax rate 
t
y: Direct tax rate 
tr: Government transfers 
ft: Foreign transfers to government 




EA: Agricultural export good 
EN: Non-agricultural export good 
ZA: Aggregate real investment in agriculture 
ZN: Aggregate real investment in non-agriculture 
G: Real government demand 
B: Balance of trade 
At
A: Scale parameter of Agricultural CET function 
At
N: Scale parameter of Non-agricultural CET function 
Aq
A: Scale parameter of Agricultural CES function 
Aq
N: Scale parameter of Non-agricultural CES function 
bt
A: Share parameter of Agricultural CET function 
bt
N: Share parameter of Non-agricultural CET function 
bq
A: Share parameter of Agricultural CES function 
bq
N: Share parameter of Non-agricultural CES function 
rt
A: Exponent parameter of Agricultural CET function 
rt
N: Exponent parameter of Non-agricultural CET function 
rq
A: Exponent parameter of Agricultural CES function 
rq
N: Exponent parameter of Non-agricultural CES function 
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